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1. Introduction
Cooperation is of utmost importance to human society, and our civilization is based upon the cooperation
between genetically unrelated individuals in large groups [1]. This is obviously true for modern societies with
large organizations and nation states, but it also holds for hunter-gather societies with sophisticated forms of
hunting, warfare, and food sharing [2].
However, cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group.
A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Since neither the naive
natural selection assumption in biology nor the pure self-interested individual assumption in economics can lead
to cooperation directly [3, 4, 5], there need to be some speciﬁc mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation in a
population [6].
Indirect reciprocity is one of the mechanisms draw much attention of most researchers. Nowak and Sigmund
introduced binary reputation, either good or bad [7]. Individuals repeatedly play a Prisoner Dilemma game with
others, each time with a diﬀerent opponent from the society. They can choose cooperation or defection. When an
individual cooperates, he pays cost c for his opponent to receive a beneﬁt b. When an individual defects, he pays
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Abstract
Cooperation is very important for a society. Social norm is regarded as a mechanism to maintain cooperation among large
amount of self-interested individuals. The theoretical works of Ohtsuki etc. ﬁnd the social norms that can make cooperation
evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained cooperation. But the comparison of these social norms is not studied. This paper
proposes a co-evolution model of social norms and individual strategies. There are many competing groups in a society with
diﬀerent social norms. Individuals interact within a group and they learn to use the most proﬁtable strategies. In the higher
level, groups learn to take the better social norms according to average payoﬀ of groups. It is found that diﬀerent social norms
are suitable for diﬀerent conditions. Under conditions with most individuals cooperating, Kandori norm is the best choice.
Under conditions with few individuals cooperating, the Simple-Standing norm is the best choice. The eﬀect of group size to
the evolution of cooperation is also studied and it indicates that the larger a group is, the slower it converges to cooperation.
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nothing. A new reputation is assigned to the players after each interaction. Those who cooperated receive a good
reputation and those who refused to help others gain a bad reputation. This rule of assigning reputation, or namely
the ’social norm’, is called ’scoring’ [8]. Nowak and Sigmund showed that under scoring conditional cooperators
who help only good individuals are resistant to defectors, because they selectively give help only to cooperative
members [7]. Reputation works as media for community enforcement [9]. The simplest as it is, scoring has a
critical shortcoming. It cannot distinguish sanction from selﬁsh defection. Scoring assigns a bad reputation to
conditional cooperators who refused to help a bad person as punishment. Therefore, no conditional cooperators
are motivated to give cheaters a penalty, which obviously leads to a triumph of defectors. Previous theoretical
works conﬁrmed that scoring is not able to sustain cooperation under errors [10].
Following this result, Ohtsuki and Iwasa searched for the combinations of a social norm and a behavioral
strategy that can maintain cooperation, among a huge number of possibilities. They found that only two norms,
simple-standing and Kandori can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained
cooperation[11]. All other norms, including scoring, ultimately lead to the invasion by defectors.
However, they did not compare how these two social norms work. What does a society should choose under
certain condition? If there are some conditions under which other social norms may be better than these two social
norms? The present paper is to answer these questions by agent based simulations.
A multi-level evolution framework is presented. In such a framework, there are many competing groups in a
society with diﬀerent social norms. Individuals interact within a group. Depending on the applied social norm,
players are t given diﬀerent reputations based on their employed strategies. Players can update their strategies
accordingly after they observe the payoﬀ diﬀerences among diﬀerent strategies. In the higher level, groups learn
to take the better social norms according to the average payoﬀs of all members of the groups.
Agent based simulation builds the model from bottom up by coding the individuals action as computer pro-
gram. Relying on the powerful computation capacity, we can model individual actions as detailed as we can
imagine. We conducted the agent based simulation of social cooperation evolution to provide the details of indi-
viduals’ interaction and learning process. By simulation, we can obtain the evolution of the social norms which
reﬂects their ﬁtness. Besides, by assigning diﬀerent sizes to groups, we can investigate the inﬂuence of group size
to social cooperation evolution.
2. The Model
There are N agents in a society. These agents are divided to M groups (M ≤ N/2). Agents of a group only
interact with other agents in the same group. They play the donor recipient game.
2.1. Donor recipient game
When two agents from the same group meet each other, one of them is chosen randomly as the donor and
the other player as a recipient. The donor has two basic behavioral choices: cooperation (C) and defection (D).
Cooperation involves a cost c for the donor and a beneﬁt b for the recipient. Defection has no cost and yields no
beneﬁt. Here c, b are both positive real number. Each individual is endowed with a binary reputation, which is
either good (G) or bad (B). The donor can base his decision on the recipient’s reputation. After each interaction,
the reputation of the donor is updated according to the ’social norm’ of the group, while the reputation of the
recipient remains unchanged. The reputation update process is susceptible to errors. With probability μ, where
0 ≤ μ ≤ 0.5, an incorrect reputation is assigned. With probability 1 − μ the correct reputation is assigned. All
individuals in the group come to the same conclusion of the donor’s reputation, i.e. there are no private lists of
reputation.
2.1.1. Strategies
Since players change their opponents every round, they always meet a stranger whom they have never met
before. For strategic choice, a player relies on the reputation of the opponent. Each player has an action rule
(or strategy), s, which depends on the recipient’s reputation. A player with an action rule s takes the action s(G)
toward a good recipient, and the action s(B) toward a bad one. Each of s(G) and s(B) can be either C or D. There
are 22 = 4 possible action rules: s(G)s(B) = CC;CD;DC;DD.
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2.1.2. Social norms
A social norm n is used for updating the reputations of players. A donor who has taken the action X(X = C;D)
toward a recipient whose reputation is J(J = G;B) is assigned a new reputation n(J;X)(= G;B) by the social norm n.
Social norms of this type are based on ’second-order assessment’, and they depend on both the action of the donor
and the reputation of the recipient. In order to attach a reputation to a player, an observer must know what action
the focal player took to whom. There are four possible outcomes: (1) the focal player cooperated with a good
opponent, (2) he cooperated with a bad opponent, (3) he defected against a good opponent, and (4) he defected
against a bad opponent. To each of the four scenarios, the reputation dynamics assigns a reputation, either good
or bad. Hence, we have 24 = 16 diﬀerent social norms in total, see Table 1. There exists a complete symmetry
between two labels, ’good’ and ’bad’. We can swap them without changing anything. Therefore, to break the
symmetry we only study the former 8 social norms.
Table 1. Sixteen conceivable second-order assessment social norms
No. C to Good D to Good C to Bad D to Bad Name
1 G G G G
2 G G G B
3 G G B G
4 G G B B Simple-standing
5 G B G G
6 G B G B
7 G B B G Kandori
8 G B B B
- B G G G
- B G G B
- B G B G
- B G B B
- B B G G
- B B G B
- B B B G
- B B B B
We pay special attention to two typical social norms. The GGBG social norm is similar to the ’standing’ [12]
for the third-order assessment problem, and called ’simples tanding’. In this social norm, cooperators in relation
to both good and bad recipients are assigned a good reputation. Defectors in regard to a bad recipient are also
assigned a good reputation. Defectors in regard to a good recipient are assigned a good reputation. This norm
has the concept of justiﬁed defection [13].The GBBG social norm is called ’scoring’, and it is the same norm
that was proved to be able to maintain the cooperative equilibrium under a much wider condition by [9] classical
work. This norm has the concept of justiﬁed defection. In addition helping a bad player is a bad action. Too much
generosity is regarded bad [14] under this norm.
2.2. Evolution of individual strategies
Individuals will learn and update their strategies to obtain a higher individual payoﬀ by imitating a better
strategy. Sometimes a player is given an opportunity to change his strategy. He randomly samples a player and
compares the diﬀerence in payoﬀs. If a sampled player has a greater payoﬀ then the sampling player will imitate
the sampled player’s strategy with a probability proportional to the diﬀerence in payoﬀs. Otherwise the sampling
player will retain the same strategy. So the expected payoﬀ of a strategy can be interpreted as its ﬁtness and
strategies with higher ﬁtness will have more chance to reproduce.
2.3. Evolution of social norms
Over a longer horizon, due to the between-society competition, societies may evolve their social norms by
comparing the average payoﬀ of all the social members that diﬀerent social norms can provide. Such a social
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norm evolution may take the form of social transformation, a civil war, an external war, colonization, etc. This
evolution framework shares the same idea with the culture group selection of Bergstrom [15], for a social norm
may be regarded as a kind of culture [16].
3. Agent-based Simulations
We designed the agent based simulation system on platform Netlogo [17], The procedure of the model is
described by the pseudo code in Algorithm 1. The Netlogo program is available by email.
3.1. Initialization
M groups are set up in a society, and each group has a social norm at the beginning of a simulation. For each
group, a number of agents are set up, and each agent has a binary reputations with probability pGR as good and
(1 − pGR) as bad. Each agent is assigned as strategy with probability pCC as CC, pCD as CD, pDC as DC , and
(1 − pCC − pCD − pDC) as DD. Three parameters pII , pIL and pGL are initialized which denoting the rate
of individual interaction, the rate of individual strategies learning and the rate of groups’ social norms learning
respectively. In simulation we use the same parameters of the donation game including μ, c, b, as mentioned
above. The simulation runs for T periods. Each period has three stages: individual interaction stage when agents
play the donation game, the individual learning stage when agents update their strategies and the social learning
stage when the groups update their social norms.
3.2. Individual Interaction stage
For each agent, a random number r drawn from uniform distribution between 0 and 1 (r ∼ U(0, 1)) is generat-
ed, and if r < pII, the agent will act as a donor. Then another agents from the same group is random selected to be
de recipient. The revenue of both agents can be determined by the donor’s strategy and the recipient’s reputation.
Both will append a new item to his revenue memory history. The reputation of the donor will be updated according
to the undertaking social norm. With a probability μ, the donor will be assigned a wrong reputation.
3.3. Individual Learning stage
Agents will learn to update their strategy according to the revenue that the strategies can provide. For each
agent, a random number r (r ∼ U(0, 1)) is generated, and if r < pIL, then agent will act as a learner and has a
opportunity to update his strategy. The learner will choose another agent randomly from all other agents in same
group to be learned. If the learners’ average revenue which is the average of the revenues in his memory history
list is smaller than that of the learned and the strategies of them are diﬀerent, the learner will change his strategy
to the one of the learned. Once an agent updates his strategy, his revenue memory list will be set to empty to keep
a new memory for the new strategy.
3.4. Social Learning stage
For each group, a random number r (r ∼ U(0, 1)) is generated, and if r < pGL, then group has a opportunity
to update his strategy. Another group will be selected randomly from all other groups to be learned. If the average
payoﬀ of all agents in the ﬁrst group is smaller than that of the learned and the norms of them are diﬀerent, the
ﬁrst group will change its norm to the one of the learned.
4. Results Analysis
4.1. The evolution of social norms
By plenty of simulations, it is found that in most cases the GGBG and GBBG norms will gradually dominate
the society, as a typical result in Fig 1. This result is consistent with that of Ohtsuki, etc. In their paper, simple-
standing and Kandori social norm can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained
cooperation.
The parameters used in this simulation are listed in Table 2.
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Algorithm 1 Simulation Procedure
Require: Number of groups M, Population size N (a array of length M which gives the number of agents in
each group); social norm norm (a array of length M which gives the social norm of each group); donation game
parameters b, c, μ; maximum memory length L; agents initial good reputation probability PGR; agents initial
ratios pCC, pCD, pDC of strategy CC, CD, CP; total runs of simulation T .
Ensure: History social norms of all groups NormHistory (a M × T matrix to save the history record of social
norms of all groups in each period), average payoﬀ of all groups AveragePayo f f History (a M × T matrix to
save the history record of average payoﬀ of all groups in each period)
// INITIALIZATION
for each group in the population do
Set the social norm random sampled from 8 candidates for the group
for each agent in the group do
Set the agent’s reputation to be GOOD with probability pGR or BAD with probability 1 − pGR
Set his strategy to be CC, CD, CP or DD with probability pCC , pCD , pDC , 1 − pCC − pCD − pDC
Set his revenue memory RevenueMemory list as empty; Set his average revenue AverageRevenue to be 0
end for
end for
// RUNNING THE SOCIETY
for each round r ∈ [1,M] do
for each agent i do
Generate a random number r uniformly from 0 to 1
if r < pII then
This agent i acts as a donor; Randomly sample an agent j from the same group as the recipient
Calculate the revenue of agent i and j according to the strategy of i and the reputation of j
Add an element with the revenue of i and j to the end of their lists of revenue memory
if the length of their revenue memory is larger than L then
Delete the ﬁrst element of RevenueMemory
end if
end if
Calculate the average revenue of i and j
Update the donors reputation according to the undertaking social norm of the group
Change the donor (from GOOD to BAD or from BAD to GOOD) with a probability μ
end for{*Above is for INDIVIDUAL INTERACTION STAGE*}
for each agent i do
Generate a random number r uniformly from 0 to 1
if r < pIL then
This agent i acts as a learner
Randomly sample an agent j from the same group to be learned
if the average revenue of agent i is smaller than that of agent j then
Set the strategy of agent i as the strategy of agent j
Set his revenue memory list as empty; Set his average revenue AverageRevenue to be 0
end if
end if
end for{*Above is for INDIVIDUAL LEARNING STAGE*}
for each group g do
Generate a random number r uniformly from 0 to 1
if r < pGL then
This group g is selected to be learn to update its norm
Randomly sample another group g′
if the average revenue of group g is smaller than that of group g′ then
Set the social norm of group g as the norm of group g′
end if
end if
end for{*Above is for GROUP LEARNING STAGE*}
Save the norm of each group in the rth column of NormHistory
Calculate the average revenue of all agents in each group and save in the rth column of
AveragePayo f f History {*Above is for DATA SAVING*}
end for
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Fig. 1. Evolution dynamics of social norms
Table 2. Typical simulation parameters
M N b c μ pGL pGR pCC pCD pDC T
500 2000 3 2 0.05 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 10000
The evolution dynamics of GGBG and GBBG norms are diﬀerent which reﬂect the ﬁtness of two norms in
diﬀerent conditions. The ratio of GBBG norms increases more quickly than GGBG norm at the beginning while
the ratio of GGBG norm increases more quickly than GBBG norm after a long time of evolution. We argue that
this is because GBBG norm is sterner to the defector than GGBG. The diﬀerence between these two norms is
their treatment to the cooperation regarding a bad recipient. In GBBG norm, cooperation to a bad recipient will
obtain a bad reputation while a good reputation in GGBG norm. So under conditions with few defectors, GBBG
norm will drive more agents to cooperate more rapidly. While under conditions with most agents cooperate,
most bad reputation is due to the reputation assignment error. The more generous GGBG norm encourages more
cooperation and will maintain higher social average revenue.
4.2. The eﬀect of group size to cooperation evolution
We also studied the eﬀect of group size to the cooperation evolution. In simulation, we assign diﬀerent groups
with diﬀerent size from 50 to 5000. Because we only focus on the eﬀect of group size, each group will keep their
social norm ﬁxed as GGBG. This is realized by setting the norm as GGBG in the initialization stage and setting
the learning rate of social norm to be 0. We care about the speed of the society converge to higher cooperation
states. So we recorded the time that a group converges to 95% cooperation which means that over 95% of the
interactions are the donor cooperation to the recipients. Fig 2 shows the relationship of group size and the time to
95% cooperation. The parameters used in this simulation are the same as in Table 2 except the group sizes.
It is easy to notice that the larger a group is, the slower it converges to cooptation. The correlation coeﬃcient
of the group size and the time to 95% cooperation is about 0.8785. We argue that if a group is very large, it is
diﬃcult for the agents in the group come to coordination and help each other.
5. Conclusions
We propose a co-evolution model of social norms and individual strategies. The society is composed of many
competing groups with diﬀerent social norms. Individuals interact within a group and they learn to use the most
proﬁtable strategies. In the higher level, groups learn to take the better social norms according to average payoﬀ
of groups. Agent-based simulations are conducted to investigate the evolution dynamics of social norms. It is
found that diﬀerent social norms are suitable for diﬀerent conditions. Under conditions with most individuals
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Fig. 2. The eﬀect of group size to cooperation evolution
cooperating, Kandori norm is the best choice. Under conditions with few individuals cooperating, the Simple-
Standing norm is the best choice. The eﬀect of group size to the evolution of cooperation is also studied and the
larger a group is, the slower it converges to higher cooperation.
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